

**GAMES 2000 (Bilbao, July 24-28)**

FIRST WORLD CONGRESS OF THE GAME THEORY SOCIETY- BILBAO

GAMES 2000 Program By Session[Return to the Games 2000 General Program page](#)

TIME	DETAILS (All Sessions are Parallel Sessions)					
Monday (July 24)						
9:45-10:30	Opening session with welcome by the President of the Basque government					MOS1
11:00-12:30	Inaugural Statement by Kenneth Arrow followed by Reinhard Selten's Keynote Lecture: "How to Play Games--Lessons From Strategy Experiments"					MOS2
12:40-1:25 Session MOS3	Session	Presenter's Name	Co-author (s)	Presenter's Affiliation	Paper Title	Chair
	MOS3.1	Alvin E. Roth	Axel Ockenfels	Harvard University	Last Minute Bidding and the Rules for Ending Second-price Auctions: Theory and Evidence from a Natural Experiment on the Internet	R. Rosenthal
	MOS3.2	Roger Guesnerie	G. Desgranges	Delta, Paris	The Transmission of Information Through Prices: An Alternative Exploratory Assessment of Market Performance	G. Mailath
	MOS3.3	Jonathan Schaeffer		University of Alberta	On Computers and Games	J. Rosenmuller
	MOS3.4	Abhijit Banerjee		M.I.T.	The Uses of Game Theory: Against a Purely Positive Interepretation of Game Theoretic Results	S. Matthews
3:00-3:45 Poster Session (MOP)	Click here for a table of presenters for the Monday Poster Session					
3:45-5:15 Contributed Papers Click here for a table of MOR1 Presenters	MOR1 Sessions and Topics					
	MOR1.1	Imperfect Monitoring				
	MOR1.2	Allocation and Assignments				
	MOR1.3	First and Second Price Auctions				
	MOR1.4	Interactive Epistemology				
	MOR1.5	Cooperative Solutions with Small Players				
	MOR1.6	Teams, Cartels and Bankuptcy				
	MOR1.7	Evolution, Cooperation and Coordination				
	MOR1.8	Networks and Coalition Formation				
	MOR1.9	Voting				
	MOR1.10	Principal-Agent and Delegation				

Contributed Papers Click here for a table of MOR2 Presenters	MOR1.11	Iterated Dominance and Equilibrium Computation
	MOR1.12	Evolutionary Selection
	MOR2 Sessions and Topics	
	MOR2.1	Bounded Repeated Games
	MOR2.2	Equilibrium and Auctions
	MOR2.3	Experiments with Reputation and Communication
	MOR2.4	Coalition Formation in Economics and Politics
	MOR2.5	Cooperation, Fairness and Public Goods
	MOR2.6	Extensions of Bargaining Solutions
	MOR2.7	Core and Consistency
	MOR2.8	Adaptive Behavior and Best Response Learning
	MOR2.9	Experts and Communication in Games
	MOR2.10	Incentive Issues in Markets
	MOR2.11	Strategic Interaction in Markets and Politics
	MOR2.12	The Structure of Equilibria

Tuesday (July 25)

9:30-10:15 Session TUS1	Session	Presenter's Name	Co-author (s)	Presenter's Affiliation	Paper Title	Chair
	TUS1.1	Howard Rosenthal		Princeton University	Recent Applications of Game Theory in Political Science	S. Brams
	TUS1.2	Abraham Neyman		Hebrew University of Jerusalem	Games with Uncertain Duration	Y. Kannai
	TUS1.3	Aldo Rustichini	Johannes Berg, Matteo Marsili, Riccardo Zecchina	Boston University	Equilibrium and Adaptive Learning in Large Games	A. Urbano
	TUS1.4	Philip J. Reny	Shmuel Zamir	University of Chicago	On the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in First-Price Auctions	D. Lehmann
10:30-11:15 Session TUS2	Session	Presenter's Name	Co-author (s)	Presenter's Affiliation	Paper Title	Chair
	TUS2.1	Roger Myerson		Northwestern University	Comparison of Scoring Rules in Poisson Voting Games	S. Zamir
	TUS2.2	Peyton Young		Johns Hopkins University	Possibility and Impossibility Results in Learning	J. Zarzuelo
	TUS2.3	Joseph Y. Halpern		Cornell Univeristy	A Computer Scientist Looks at Game Theory	Y. Moses
	TUS2.4	Mark Satterthwaite		Northwestern University	The Optimality of the Double Auction Trading Mechanism	M. Wooders
11:45- 12:30 Session TUS3	Session	Presenter's Name	Co-author (s)	Presenter's Affiliation	Paper Title	Chair
	TUS3.1	Harold W. Kuhn		Princeton University	Extensive Games Revisited	G. Owen
	TUS3.2	Eric Maskin		Princeton University	Efficiency in Auctions	T. Ichiishi
	TUS3.3			Caltech		A. McLennan

INTERNET ARCHIVE WayBackMachine		8 captures 10 Aug 04 - 9 Aug 11		Richard D. McKelvey		http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/faculty/kalal/html/timesess.htm		Effects of "Mistakes" in Game Theoretic Models of Political Processes		AUG SEP 17 2003 2004		
TUS3.4		Ehud Lehrer				Tel Aviv University		Approachability and Its Applications		M. Bacharach		
12:40-1:30		David M. Kreps (Stanford University and Tel Aviv University), The Donald P. Jacobs Lecture: "Game Theory and Management"									TUS4	
3:00-3:45 Tuesday poster session (TUP)		Click here for a table of presenters for the Tuesday Poster Session										
3:45-5:15 Contributed Papers		TUR1 Sessions and Topics										
Click here for a table of TUR1 Presenters		TUR1.1		Knowledge and Uncertainty								
		TUR1.2		Issues in Bargaining and Matching								
		TUR1.3		Core Stability								
		TUR1.4		Multi-Item Auctions								
		TUR1.5		Contracts, Coordination and Polarization								
		TUR1.6.		Alternative Notions of Equilibrium								
		TUR1.7		Solutions of Cooperative Games								
		TUR1.8		Equilibrium Selection and Computation								
		TUR1.9		Topics in Repeated Games								
		TUR1.10		Sequential Coalition Formation								
		TUR1.11		Bargaining and Implementation								
		TUR1.12		Information and Technology in Markets								
5:45-7:15 Contributed Papers		TUR2 Sessions and Topics										
Click here for a table of TUR2 Presenters		TUR2.1		Learning in Economic Environments								
		TUR2.2		Specialized Equilibria in Markets								
		TUR2.3		Optimal Auctions								
		TUR2.4		Informational Issues in Equilibrium								
		TUR2.5		Social Implementation								
		TUR2.6		Market Structure								
		TUR2.7		Entropy and Complexity in Dynamic Environments								
		TUR2.8		Stochastic Games and Evolution								
		TUR2.9		Extensions of Cooperative Solutions								
		TUR2.10		Coalition Formation, Theory and Experiment								
		TUR2.11		Special Classes of Cooperative Games								
		TUR2.12		Value and Power Indices								
Wednesday (July 26)												
9:30-10:15 Session WES1		Session	Presenter's Name	Co-author (s)	Presenter's Affiliation	Paper Title			Chair			
		WES1.1	Sylvain Sorin	Abraham Neyman	Ecole Polytechnique and U. Paris	Repeated Games with Incomplete Information and Uncertain Duration			T. E. S. Raghavan			
		WES1.2	Matthew O. Jackson		Caltech	The Endogenous Choice of Mechanisms: Self-Stable Majority Voting Rules			G. Gambarelli			
		WES1.3	Kyle Bagwell		Columbia University	The Theory of the WTO			H. Peters			

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	THS2.3	Nicolas Vieille		Laboratoire d'Econometrie, Ecole Polytechnique, Paris and Grape, Universite Montesquieu-Bordeaux 4	Recent Developments in Stochastic Games		H. Imai		
11:45-12:30 Session THS3	Session	Presenter's Name	Co-author (s)	Presenter's Affiliation	Paper Title		Chair		
	THS3.1	Moshe Tennenholtz		Technion and Stanford University	Mechanism Design for Computational Settings		A. Brandenburger		
	THS3.2	Margaret Meyer	Christopher Avery	Nuffield College	Choosing Procedures for Eliciting Advice from Biased Advisors		J.-F. Ponsard		
	THS3.3	Ehud Kalai		Northwestern University	Information-proof Equilibria in Macro Bayesian Games		M. Stinchcombe		
	THS3.4	Jean-Francois Mertens	Isabel Grilo	CORE	Cournot Equilibrium		J.-P. Benoit		
12:40-1:30	Gerard Debreu's Introduction followed by Robert J. Aumann's "Presidential Address"							THS4	
3:00-3:45 Thursday poster session (THP)	Click here for a table of presenters for the Thursday Poster Session								
3:45-5:15 Contributed Papers Click here for a table of THR1 Presenters	THR1 Sessions and Topics								
	THR1.1	Value and Power Indices							
	THR1.2	Collusions in Auctions							
	THR1.3	Voting Through Parties							
	THR1.4	Learning: Theory and Experiments							
	THR1.5	Mechanisms and Implementation							
	THR1.6	Contests, Entry and R&D							
	THR1.7	Repeated Games with and without Complete Information							
	THR1.8	Evolution with Local Interaction							
	THR1.9	Special Classes of Coalitional Games							
	THR1.10	Foundations of Bargaining and Cooperative Solutions							
	THR1.11	Signaling and Information Transmission							
	THR1.12	Equilibria of Extensive Games							
5:45-7:15 Contributed Papers Click here for a table of THR2 Presenters	THR2 Sessions and Topics								
	THR2.1	Special Classes of Bargaining Solutions							
	THR2.2	Experiments Regarding Economic Issues							
	THR2.3	Comparisons of Learning Models							
	THR2.4	Coalitional Games in Economic Environments							
	THR2.5	Games with Infinitely Many Strategies and Players							
	THR2.6	Solutions to Stochastic Games							

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THR2.7	Fair Division and Allocation http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/faculty/kalai/hm/timesess.htm	Go	AUG SEP
R2.8	Rational Learning		◀ 17 ▶
THR2.9	The Stability of Governance Structures		2003 2004 20
THR2.10	Rationalizability, Awareness and Beliefs		
THR2.11	Quality Issues in Trade		
THR2.12	Timing in Strategic Interaction		

Friday (July 28)

9:30-10:15 Session FRS1	Session	Presenter's Name	Co-author (s)	Presenter's Affiliation	Paper Title	Chair
	FRS1.1	William Thomson		University of Rochester	An Axiomatic Theory of Bargaining: An Update	J.-M. Bilbao
	FRS1.2	Eric Van Damme	Jorgen W. Weibull	Tilburg University	Evolution and Refinement with Endogenous Mistake Probabilities	C. Holt
	FRS1.3	David Schmeidler	Ithzak Gilboa	Tel Aviv and Ohio State Universities	Inductive Inference: An Axiomatic Approach	S. Tijs

10:30-11:15 Session FRS2	Session	Presenter's Name	Co-author (s)	Presenter's Affiliation	Paper Title	Chair
	FRS2.1	Sergiu Hart		The Hebrew University of Jerusalem	Evolutionary Dynamics and Backward Induction	T. Palfrey
	FRS2.2	Francoise Forges	Jean-Francois Mertens, Rajiv Vohra	Université de Cergy-Pontoise	The Incentive Compatible Core of an Economy with Differential Information: The Quasi-Linear Case	E. Ben-Porath
	FRS2.3	Brian Skyrms		University of California	Co-evolution of Norms: A Case Study	M. Sotomayor

11:45-12:30 Session FRS3	Session	Presenter's Name	Co-author (s)	Presenter's Affiliation	Paper Title	Chair
	FRS3.1	Barry O'Neill		Stanford University	The Treatment of Emotions in Game Theory	X. Vives
	FRS3.2	Andrew Postlewaite	Richard McLean	University of Pennsylvania	Efficient Auction Mechanisms with Multidimensional Signals	A. Kirman
	FRS3.3	Vincent Crawford	Miguel Costa-Gomes, Bruno Broseta	University of California, San Diego	Cognition and Behavior in Normal-form Games: An Experimental Study	A. Alkan

12:40-1:30	Lloyd Shapley (University of California), The Oskar Morgenstern Lecture: "Ethics and Clusters"	FRS4
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3:00-4:30 Contributed Papers <u>Click here for a table of FRR1 Presenters</u>	FRR1 Sessions and Topics	
	FRR1.1	Combinatorial Auctions
	FRR1.2	Quantal Response and Experiments
	FRR1.3	Matching
	FRR1.4	Empirical Studies in Sports and Markets
	FRR1.5	Dynamic Duopoly and Oligopoly
	FRR1.6	Spatial Voting
	FRR1.7	Games in Markets
	FRR1.8	Strategic Aggregation of Information

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	FRR1.10 Stochastic and Extensive Games FRR1.11 Evolutionary Phenomena
	FRR1.12 Convexity in Coalitional Games
4:45-5:30	FRR2 Sessions and Topics FRR2.1 Authority Structure and Bargaining FRR2.2 Equilibrium in Markets FRR2.3 Knowledge and Uncertainty FRR2.4 Bargaining and Auctions in Markets FRR2.5 Extensive Form Games FRR2.6 Strategic Potential Games FRR2.7 Min-Max Strategies FRR2.8 Complexity in Bargaining FRR2.9 Lessons from History and Testable Theory FRR2.10 Cheap Talk FRR2.11 Correlated Equilibria and Sunspots