GEB will publish a special issue dedicated to the memory of Joseph Y. Halpern. With his immense energy and broad intellectual curiosity, Joe was instrumental in connecting the game theory community to a wide variety of fields including logic, multi-agent systems, distributed computing, artificial intelligence, cryptography, linguistics, and philosophy. He was the spiritus rector behind the biannual multidisciplinary TARK conferences that furthered our understanding of reasoning about rationality, knowledge, belief, and awareness. All members of the GEB community are invited to submit papers.
Topics: Befitting Joe Halpern’s wide-ranging contributions, the special issue will focus on foundational contributions to knowledge, belief, and awareness in game theory and decision theory as well as interdisciplinary work at the intersection of computer science, artificial intelligence, logic on one hand and game theory and decision theory on the other hand. Such contributions may include papers at the foundations of the theory, but also applications that help with the understanding of the foundations.
Submission and evaluation: If you would like your GEB submitted paper to be considered for publication in the special issue, you should indicate so by picking “Joseph Halpern Memorial Special Issue” as the article type and mentioning this in your cover letter. The deadline to be considered for the special issue is February 13, 2027, the first anniversary of Joe’s death.
We were all deeply saddened by the sudden death of Joseph Y. Halpern, and we hope that you participate with us in honoring him.
Sincerely yours,
The guest editors (Lawrence Blume, Yoram Moses, Rafael Pass, Burkhard Schipper)
Special issue of Games and Economic Behavior in honor of 50 years “Agreeing to Disagree”
Guest editors
Christina Katt-Pawlowitsch
Université Paris-Panthéon-Assas, Laboratoire d’Économie Mathématique, France
christina.pawlowitsch@assas-universite.fr
Ziv Hellman
Bar-Ilan University, Economics, Israel
Yoram Moses
Technion, Electrical Engineering, Israel
Herakles Polemarchakis
Warwick University, Economics, UK
Half a century after its publication, Aumann’s Agreement Theorem (“Agreeing to Disagree,” The Annals of Statistics, 1976) has not ceased to intrigue and inspire. The Agreement Theorem states that if two individuals assign the same prior probability over the set of possible states of the world and if—thanks to the common knowledge of their information partitions—the posterior probabilities they attribute to an event are common knowledge, then these posterior probabilities must be identical. This result builds on a conceptual innovation that is as powerful as elegant: identifying what is commonly known between the participants in an exchange with the meet—the finest common coarsening—of the information partitions.
The agreement result and the formal language for modeling knowledge and beliefs introduced by Aumann have inspired research in multiple directions, such as:
• dynamic foundations of the Agreement Theorem through Bayesian dialogues and applications to betting and trading scenarios;
• generalizations and extensions of the formal framework, such as moving from finite partitions to σ-algebras and from knowledge of events to knowledge of random variables;
• axiomatizations of knowledge and belief in terms of modal knowledge operators;
• relaxations of common knowledge through notions of “almost” common knowledge and common belief;
• applications to distributed computing systems and classical agreement problems in computer science, such as “coordinated attack” and simultaneous Byzantine agreement;
• relaxations of the common prior hypothesis addressing the robustness of the Agreement Theorem.
With this special issue, we mark the fiftieth anniversary of the publication of “Agreeing to Disagree.” We aim in particular to highlight the productivity of the theory for stimulating new research and providing insights into contemporary problems.
Besides original contributions to any of the research programs mentioned above, we invite:
• critical methodological or historical assessments of the Agreement Theorem, or more generally, the concept of common knowledge and models of interactive knowledge and belief revision;
• comparisons to similar accounts in other fields, such as philosophy and linguistics;
• novel applications of the Agreement Theorem to problems in economics, computer science, political science, philosophy, linguistics, sociology, psychology, or any other field.
Submissions: Through editorial system of Games and Economic Behavior by mentioning “Special Issue ‘50 Years of Agreeing to Disagree’” in the cover letter.
Due date: December 30, 2026.
Special issue of The International Journal of Game Theory on “Games, Decisions, and Language”
guest editors: P Egré, C Pawlowitsch, J Sobel, B Spector, B von Stengel
submission deadline: 31 May 2024
The International Journal of Game Theory (IJGT) invites submissions of significant papers at the interface of Linguistics and Game Theory. Both disciplines are studies of interaction with common topics. However, papers in one area often use only rudimentary versions of the other, such as extremely simple games in linguistic models, or ad-hoc theories of language in economics papers. In this collection, we aim for articles that employ linguistics and game theory with a significant contribution from the other field.
The deadline for submission for this Special Issue is 31st May 2022.
Guest editors are
Gary E. Bolton (University of Texas at Dallas)
Emin Karagözoğlu (Bilkent University)
The special issue is dedicated to the International Conference on Mathematical Optimization for Fair Social Decisions: A tribute to Michel Balinski, https://tombalinski.sciencesconf.org
The editors solicit high-quality, multi-disciplinary contributions that address mathematical (continuous and discrete) optimization (algorithms and modeling) in the context of game theory, voting, matching, fair division, cost-sharing, social choice, mechanism design, price of anarchy, and other areas relevant to social decisions. Papers that are only social science are not suitable for this special issue as well as papers that only consider optimization. See here for details. The deadline for submission is December 15, 2020. The editors are
Mourad Baiou, baiou@isima.fr
José Correa, correa@uchile.cl
Rida Laraki, rida.laraki@gmail.com
