During the last 10 to 15 years, one of the major foundational developments in game theory, decision theory, and economic theory has been modeling asymmetric unawareness. Decision makers may not just lack information in a standard sense but may also not conceive of some relevant aspects of decision problems. The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics is inviting contributions for publication in a special section on modeling unawareness and its applications to economics and finance. We anticipate a timely editorial process with highly competent reviewers.

Submission deadline:     December 15, 2018

 Electronic submission:   https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/dgbejte

Select “unawareness special issue” and mention the special issue in your submission letter.

Special section editor:    Burkhard Schipper, University of California, Davis

The inaugural issue of the Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design has recently been published. The journal – based at the University of York and edited by a team of 52 leading experts from all over the world – is an open-access, independent, peer-reviewed, non-profit, English-language journal with the purpose of disseminating and sharing the latest knowledge and understanding of the subject widely. It aims to publish original articles that deal with the issues of designing, improving, analyzing and testing economic, financial, political, or social mechanisms and institutions. It is free of charge to the authors and the readers and open-access to everyone.

Please visit its website http://www.mechanism-design.org/ for further information.

Guest Editors:

Maurizio Falcone, Universita di Roma “La Sapienza”, falcone@mat.uniroma1.it

Herbert Dawid, Bielefeld University, hdawid@wiwi.uni-bielefeld.de

Dynamic Games (DG) offer a natural paradigm to study numerous problems in different areas ranging from economics and management science to engineering and social sciences. Realistic models in these fields are in general analytically intractable, and their treatment requires the use of numerical methods to obtain reliable approximate optimal strategies for the players, which can be implemented in a reasonable amount of time.

In 2017 Dynamic Games and Applications will publish a special issue on the subject, focused in particular on the following topics:

  • Analysis of approximation schemes for DG;
  • Constructive approaches to Cooperative and Noncooperative DG;
  • Open-loop and closed loop equilibria;
  • DG with multiple stable steady-states;
  • Fast and parallel methods for DG;
  • Numerical methods for hybrid and multi-mode DG;
  • Numerical methods for Mean Field Games;
  • Numerical treatment of DG applications in different fields, e.g., economics, management science, finance, social dynamics (consensus, flocking, swarming, etc.), engineering, communication, electric power markets and networks.

The special issue welcomes submissions from theoreticians as well as applied researchers.

Submission Deadline: December 15th, 2015
Publication Date: March 2017 (issue 1 of Volume 7 of DGAA)

Earlier submission is encouraged, and papers will appear online following acceptance in advance of the production of the full special issue.

For submission instructions, please visit:

The International Journal of Game Theory (IJGT) encourages submissions of significant papers in Combinatorial Game Theory, and has invited Aviezri Fraenkel to its Editorial Board to deal with these submissions.

IJGT, founded in 1971, has a long tradition of publishing papers in game theory with significant mathematical content. Combinatorial Game Theory has developed into a field with advanced mathematical and computational complexity techniques and a number of challenging open questions, where new results will nicely fit with and complement the scope of IJGT.

Combinatorial games are typically two-player games with perfect information and “win”, “lose”, and “draw” or “tie” as possible outcomes, and an underlying mathematical structure. This is in contrast to games involving chance and lack of information such as Poker, which are central to “classical” game theory.

A basic combinatorial game is Nim, given by a number of heaps of chips where players alternately remove some chips from one of those heaps, and the last player to move wins. Over a century ago, it was shown how to play Nim optimally using the binary representation of the heap sizes. This method can be extended to “impartial” games where the available moves from any position do not depend on the player to move. An important algebraic structure is the “sum” of games where a player can move in one of several independent parts of the game. Such decompositions are important, for example, to improve algorithms for playing endgames of the board game Go where humans still highly outperform computers.

Recent progress in Combinatorial Game Theory concern difficult questions on partizan (not impartial) games such as chess, misère play (where the last player to move loses) and interactions of game tokens, both of which conflict with the “sum” of games, and computational hardness questions.

The classical book on combinatorial games is “Winning ways” by Berlekamp, Conway, and Guy from 1982, recently republished. More recently (2007) the reader-friendly enticing textbook “Lessons in Play” was produced by Albert, Nowakowski and Wolfe; and now (2013) also the authoritative graduate text “Combinatorial Game Theory” by Aaron Siegel. As shown by Conway, all two-player games can be constructed by a simple Dedekind-reminiscent cut, with a rich mathematical theory. All real numbers are a subset of the set of all games. Many challenging questions concern the computational complexity of optimal play, given a particular game specification.

Given the advanced development and mathematical depth of Combinatorial Game Theory, its significant papers will be a welcome contribution to IJGT. We hope that IJGT will be considered as the premier publication outlet by the Combinatorial Game Theory community.

1 July 2011

Shmuel Zamir, Editor, and
Bernhard von Stengel, Co-Editor of IJGT

For further information and questions, please contact Bernhard von Stengel at stengel@nash.lse.ac.uk

Guest Editors:

Martin Dufwenberg (University of Arizona) and

Amrish Patel (University of East Anglia)

Psychological Game Theory is a formal framework for studying strategic interaction when players have belief-dependent motivations. The framework was first introduced by Geanakoplos, Pearce and Stacchetti (1989, GEB) and further developed by Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2009, JET). It has proved useful in modelling intentions-based reciprocity (the pioneer application, due to Rabin 1993, AER), emotions (e.g. anger, guilt, regret, disappointment, anxiety) and concern with the opinion of others (e.g. social respect).
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization (JEBO) will publish a special issue which aims to gather frontier related research. Relevant topics include:

  • basic theory,
  • experimental tests,
  • applied work, and
  • reflections on the field.

Submission deadline: 31st January 2018.

For further details and submission instructions see the journal website.

The issue is expected to appear in the third quarter of 2018.